THE MIRAGE OF NON-STATE GOVERNANCE
Ralf Michaels*
Maybe what is really important for our modernity—that is, for our
present—is not so much the statization [étatisation] of society, as the
“governmentalization” of the state.1
[I]f that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual,
it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other
collective forces . . . . It is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone,
nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this conflict of social
forces that individual liberties are born.2
I. BEYOND THE STATE
In a story that does not lose its appeal merely because it is apocryphal, the
adolescent Luis Buñuel tries to convince his friend to go pee with him at the altar
in their staunchly catholic village. The friend says no. “Come on, let’s pee on the
altar,” says Buñuel. No, says the friend. “What’s the matter?” insists Buñuel. “Are
you a coward? Are you afraid of the priest? Are you afraid of God’s wrath?” The
friend says no. “Then why won’t you pee on the altar?” “I have no need to pee at
the altar,” replies the friend. “I do not believe in God.”
The fascination with non-state governance reminds me of this story. The
debate about global governance and the corresponding role of the state has had its
fair share of altar-peeing and offered challenges (sometimes adolescent, sometimes
brilliant) to the state’s overarching authority. Some of this work has been
pathbreaking—as have, of course, the films of Buñuel, who has certainly been
more influential than his apocryphal friend. But in the end, Buñuel’s filmmaking
always displayed, in its strongest atheist provocations, a deep ultimate faith, so
nicely expressed in Buñuel’s famous quote that he is “still an atheist, thank God.”3
The same is true with much of the state-opposing and state-denying literature in
globalization. Its greatest weakness is that, by putting the object of its opposition
and its denial at the center of analysis, it cannot escape it.
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This is not for lack of trying. During the heyday of globalization discourse, in
the 1990s, there was much talk of a “decline of the state,”4 which in turn spurred
an intense search for alternatives to state law and state-based government. Nonstate governance was suddenly chic. Markets, corporations, industries, religious
communities, ethnic communities, Internet users—diverse groups of all kinds—
were praised (or damned) for their ability to self-govern without interference from
the state. After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the bailout of the financial
system, some of this excitement has decreased, and now we are said to be
witnessing a return of the state, of some sorts.5 If global capital markets once
served as the most impressive example of extensive governance structures
allegedly outside the state—with private regulators in the Basle Committee, private
rule-makers in corporate law offices6—then the massive bailout reactions by
governments after the collapse of the financial system reminded everyone of the
remaining central position of the state. As a consequence, “non-state governance”
sounds outdated again.
The problem is not just the rise and fall of the non-state in parallel with the
fall and rise of the state in the world. A bigger problem in discussions over the rise
and fall of the relative position of the state in the world, as well as with discussions
over the “proper mix” of public and private governance structures, is that the core
elements—the state, public, and private governance—are abstract entities taken to
be constant over space and time. Is “the state” always the same over time and
space? What exactly is the difference between public and private governance?
Issues of method—whether the state still presents the paradigm of our research into
4
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governance—are intermingled with matters of history, i.e., what role “the state”
actually plays in the world.7
But the biggest problem is, why does all of this matter? Simply put, do we not
care more about good versus bad governance than we care about state versus nonstate governance? And if we do, is the difference state/non-state or the difference
public/private really the prime criterion by which to assess governance?
The state has long been the most important political myth to determine and
constrain our political thinking.8 Yet non-state governance is, if anything, more,
not less, mythical: an ideologically laden concept, a romantic idea. It looks
attractive to those who oppose the state—free market proponents on the political
right, advocates for local indigenous communities on the left. But from this
perspective, the idea of non-state law and non-state governance appears rather
antiquated. Of course, the broadened focus on non-state structures is crucial, and
any attempt, in legal studies as well as in political science, to integrate such
traditionally neglected structures is to be welcomed. However, non-state is the
false perspective for these phenomena. Non-state governance is a mirage, a mere
mirror image of the state—its opposite or its copy. Instead of overcoming the state,
the perspective on non-state governance essentializes the state. If we want to
overcome our traditional focus on the state, we must overcome our focus on the
non-state, too. Instead of the formal and artificial differentiation state/non-state, we
should look for functional differentiations between different modes of governance.
In this Essay, I offer three theses, all of which are critical. First, non-state
governance is conceptually unattractive; it is a concept that makes little sense.9
Second, non-state governance is empirically unattractive; meaningful non-state
governance rarely exists.10 Third, meaningful non-state governance is normatively
unattractive; we would rarely want it, and people postulating it usually expect the
state to play an important role.11 However, I also have something constructive: a
proposed trajectory. Talk about the state and the non-state can only be an
7
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intermediary stage in a trajectory of a theory of governance that might lead to a
new paradigm of governance. This trajectory would move from state centralism via
a state/non-state dichotomy and a state/non-state hybridity toward a new paradigm
of governance beyond the state.12
II. CONCEPTS
What exactly is meant by non-state governance? It makes sense to start with
governance, a notoriously unclear term, though not an entirely useless one. Current
usage of the term emerges from the search in the 1970s and 1980s for a broader
concept than that of government, which was seen to be too focused on the state.13
Such a broader concept appeared necessary for empirical and normative reasons.
Empirically, it had become clear that traditional ideas about regulation that focused
on direct state regulation were not working, a situation sometimes referred to as the
crisis of governability.14 Normatively, it seemed desirable to focus on broader
reforms than merely those of state institutions in order to bring about change and
progress. Governance thus provided an alternative to government in the sense that
it was more encompassing: it included non-state actors in addition to state actors,
and it included additional tools to that of top-down regulation.
The term governance, however, is as old as government. The roots of both
terms lie in Greek (κυβερνήτης) and Latin (gubernare); usage in English goes back
to at least Chaucer, as evidenced by the Oxford English Dictionary.15 More
important, both governance and government were long used interchangeably,
because government meant largely what we today refer to as governance. Foucault,
in his lecture on governmentality, reminds us that the virulent debates in the
sixteenth century on “good government” were not at all confined to state
government, but concerned all aspects of public and private life:
One has, for example, the question of the government of oneself,
that ritualization of the problem of personal conduct characteristic of the
sixteenth century Stoic revival. There is the problem too of the
government of souls and lives, the entire theme of Catholic and
Protestant pastoral doctrine. There is government of children and the
great problematic of pedagogy that emerges and develops during the
sixteenth century. And, perhaps only as the last of these questions to be
taken up, there is the government of the state by the prince.16
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In other words, neither governance nor government was confined in any
particular way to the state. Only with the rise of the nation-state as an organizing
concept of politics and of society did a hierarchical system emerge, and the state
maintained an important stage at the top of the hierarchy of different governments
(“the last of these questions to be taken up”): self-government (morality), family
government (or economy, in the old sense of oiko-nomia, literally house[hold]
administration), and state government (politics).17
Notably, this hierarchy, established in political theory, mirrors the hierarchy
established in the legal theory of natural law system. A famous example is the
hierarchy of laws established by Pufendorf, which also runs up from the individual
(law of persons) via family law to state law.18 Just as government was not confined
to the state for sixteenth century political theory, likewise, law was not confined to
state law for the natural law tradition.19
This has, of course, changed dramatically. Foucault describes the struggle in
the seventeenth century to establish the economy within the (state) governmental
sphere, and it did not take long until the individual level, including morality, also
came to be viewed as a function of state government.20 In fact, the detailed rules in
the Prussian Civil Code on such seemingly private matters as how often a mother
should nurse her child21 were possible because the Code was based on Pufendorf’s
hierarchical system.22 Simultaneously, law was more and more connected to the
emerging nation state—first public law (as the idea, quite radical at first, that the
government should be bound by rules),23 later private law.24 When Justice Holmes,
in 1917, derided the idea of a law that transcends political authority as “a brooding
omnipresence in the sky,”25 law had become necessarily tied to a political entity,
and that entity could at the time be only the state. This is, in a nutshell, how we
have come to think of both government and law as tied to the state—as the
17
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consequence of convergent developments in politics (the rise of the nation state),
ideology (the desire to delegitimize authority outside the government, a continuous
theme between absolutism and representative democracy) and theory. From this
perspective, the introduction of governance beyond the state is not a revolution, but
a counterrevolution, directed against the revolutionary redefinition of government
as exclusively resting in the state.
However, the idea of governance does not fully turn back the clock; it
remains, in its contemporary emanations, defined by its relation to state
government. Governance is what the state does, even if other groups do it, too.
Non-state governance is what these other groups and institutions do like the state,
just minus the state. Consider, for example, the variety described in Stewart
Macaulay’s important essay on private government:
If governing involves making rules, interpreting them, applying
them to specific cases, and sanctioning violations, some of [recte: or] all
of this is done by such different clusters of people as the Mafia, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the American Arbitration
Association, those who run large shopping centers, neighborhood
associations, and even the regulars at Smokey’s tavern.26
True, interesting, and important. But nothing, it appears, holds these groups
together apart from a characteristic they share—making rules, etc.—that is
borrowed from the state, and from a negative quality they have: they are not the
state. We should pay more attention to these groups, but it is unclear how any
comprehensive concept of governance can leave the state out while keeping
everything else in. Whatever these groups are doing, it seems, is defined by what
the state does.
The problem thus described—that non-state governance, far from being
independent from the state, is defined by it—is enhanced by another finding. “The
state” (and thus the non-state) is an abstract entity, abstracted both from the
institutions that it combines and from the great variation of actual states we find
over space and time. This abstraction is to some degree justified, even necessary,
in law, especially where, as in continental European thinking, the state is often
equated with the law.27 It also correlates, at least in the past, to popular ideas of
common identity28 and in findings of relatively great value coherence within
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states.29 Beyond this, the abstract idea of the state is deeply problematic in social
scientific research of governance. Over space, the similar treatment of big Western
states and small postcolonial states as “states” is at best unhelpful. Over time, the
ever-changing nature of the state has been an important factor in its longevity.
Saskia Sassen has rightly emphasized that globalization is not an occurrence
outside the state but instead that the state is an active participant in it and in its own
transformation.30 As a consequence, the state under conditions of globalization is
different from the state prior to globalization, and any category of non-state
governance must be updated constantly to take account of this changing character.
It may thus be that certain new governance institutions are incompatible with the
traditional states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but this suggests only
that we should leave those traditional ideas of the state behind, not the state
altogether.
III. EMPIRICS
The conceptual unattractiveness of non-state governance as a purely negative
category is enhanced by the empirical insight that real non-state governance—
governance in the absence of a state—may indeed exist, but it is exceedingly
rare.31 Almost all governance combines public and private, or governmental and
non-governmental, aspects. This is hardly ever denied, but it is often forgotten. The
starkest example is the incessant invocation of a lex mercatoria as an alleged selfmade and autonomous law of international trade, created and administered by
merchants (and their lawyers) in the absence of the state. Once a topic mainly for
lawyers, lex mercatoria is now increasingly being discussed in the social sciences,
too.32 But the autonomous lex mercatoria is a myth, both in its ancient and in its
29
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New Imperialism, 27 NEW POL. SCI. 123, 125 (2005) (arguing that the state has rebounded
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modern form.33 The purported autonomous and trans-European commercial law of
the middle ages consisted, at best, of procedural rules; substantive commercial law
rules were built on those of the European common law, sometimes referred to as
the mother of the law merchant.34 The contemporary lex mercatoria combines
rules from domestic and international law with those emerging in commerce;
institutionally, the need to enforce arbitral awards and the possibility to nullify
them in state court are evidence not of the autonomy of lex mercatoria but instead
of the entwinement between transnational commerce and the state.35 Participants in
global commerce seem to have no interest in an autonomous non-state law, and
why would they? They pick and choose between state and non-state laws and
institutions on the basis of functionality.36 Lex mercatoria as non-state law is a
myth.
This insight applies not only to lex mercatoria but also to various other
alleged sites of non-state governance. The self-regulation of corporations comes
with the strong protection and enforcement of the state with its law; the internal
affairs doctrine is just that—not a social reality of self-governance, but instead a
rule of state law necessary for corporate self-governance. The self-regulation of
industries is often a way to stave off or to replicate state regulation.37 Early
fantasies of an autonomous Internet with its own legal order have given way to
realization of the role played by detailed regulation by the state.38 Global Islam
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY passim (2003)
(offering a critical analysis of the role international economic law plays in creating and
maintaining of global power relations); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and
Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627 passim (2006) (discussing how the
transnational business community has evolved and uses “‘a-national’ principles of contract
and a system of private ‘courts’ to organize and regulate cross-border commercial
exchange”).
33
See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 447, 452–60 (2007).
34
See Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, OXFORD U.
COMP. L. F. (2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml, text accompanying nn.
11, 12, & 13; Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An
Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 27–29 (2004); Jansen & Michaels,
supra note 19, at 368; Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex
Mercatoria Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427, 446–47 (1999).
35
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INT’L 179, passim (2006).
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an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 711–12 (2008).
Here, as elsewhere, the impact goes both ways: as the state influences business, so business
influences the state. See Gregory Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal
Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV. 147, 169–72 (2009).
38
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may look like a powerful non-state network, but in reality it is so intimately linked
with existing states that claiming it as non-state governance would be bold.39
Religious groups in the United States enjoy a large degree of autonomy from the
state and consequent freedom to self-regulate, but the basis for this autonomy, at
least from the perspective of the state, is the First Amendment, and the boundaries
of the autonomy are a matter of adjudication in secular courts. The Catholic
Church, far from being a non-state institution, has even been characterized as the
precursor to the first modern Western state.40 The allegedly autochthonous nonstate legal orders in colonies have been shown to be largely constructs by and for
the purpose of the colonizing state.41
Actually, we find real non-state governance only in areas where no
functioning state exists, and there are few such areas in our world of states. One
candidate is local communities that remain untouched by civilization; but even
here the state is anything but absent. Take the news of the uncontacted tribe found
in the Amazon jungle in Brazil in 2008.42 That tribe is nowhere autonomous from
the state; quite the contrary, the very reason we have pictures of the tribe is that the
Brazilian government department for Indian affairs (together with nongovernmental organizations) uses them to advocate their position in the ongoing
struggle over land rights in Brazil.43 Autonomy from the state is a direct
consequence of protection by the state. Another example is governance in failed
states—Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorists in Somalia, the Mafia in Sicily. Here we
may be able to speak of non-state governance simply because no effective state
exists (although the actual role of the respective state in the protection of these
groups, especially in Afghanistan and Somalia, is not irrelevant). But even this is
not governance independent from the state; it is governance enabled by the absence
of a state that can hardly yield generalizable insights.
One might argue that governance without the state must be possible because
governance existed prior to the modern state.44 But the fact that governance
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) (“[T]he conceptual structure
and jurisprudential assumptions of digital libertarianism lead its practitioners to ignore the
ways in which the state can often use privatized enforcement and state-backed technologies
to evade some of the supposed practical (and constitutional) restraints on the exercise of
legal power over the Internet.”).
39
See CLARK BENNER LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 1
(2006) (explaining that Muslim nations incorporate the law of Islam into their state
constitutions). Another issue is the Islamic theory of the (Islamic) state itself and of the
ummah.
40
HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 113–15 (1983).
41
See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245–
46 (2009) with references.
42
Isolated Tribe Spotted in Brazil, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7426794.stm.
43
Id.
44
See Fernanda Pirie, Law Before Government: Ideology and Aspiration, 30 OX. J.
LEGAL STUD. 207 (2010).
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without a state was possible in a world without states has few direct implications
for a world with states.45 Macaulay’s article on “private government” demonstrates
this point. The entire article is devoted to the question of how private governance
relates to that of the state—whether it stands in harmony or conflict with it,46 to
what extent structures of private governance are an impediment to effective state
regulation,47 whether private governance can fulfill the role traditionally reserved
for state law in different social theories,48 and whether private governance can
fulfill the legitimacy criteria traditionally used for the state.49 In other words, in an
article ostentatiously devoted to private governance, Macaulay displays an almost
obsessive focus on the state. He himself hastens to add that a sharp line between
public and private governments such as these cannot be drawn.50 But then his
analysis becomes murky. When he advocates “a ‘private government perspective’
which both recognizes private associations that affect government and also treats
distinctions between public and private spheres as doubtful rather than as given,”51
he manages, in one sentence, to proclaim the need of a distinction between a public
and a private perspective, and the impossibility of that very distinction. We need a
private perspective, he seems to be saying, precisely because the private cannot be
distinguished from the public. We need to isolate non-state governance because we
cannot separate it from state government.
Although state governance and non-state governance rarely exist in isolation,
this does not mean that they are similar. Quite the contrary: if almost all
governance is a mix between private and public—or state and non-state—
governance, the relative distribution of labor between state and non-state is not
random. The state has strategic advantages: “a technical administrative capacity
that cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional arrangement[,] . . .
military power, which for some states is global power,” as well as unmatched
financial means to save an ailing financial system,52 as we know after the bailout.
At the same time, the state still faces strategic disadvantages: relative immobility
45

See Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68
MOD. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (2005) (“We can . . . identify law with a diffuse . . . notion of
normative order. But that characterization of the understandings and practices of ‘stateless’
societies, as constituting legal orders, does not tell us much we might want to know about
them.”); cf. A. Claire Cutler, Globalization, the Rule of Law, and the Modern Law
Merchant: Medieval or Late Capitalist Associations?, 8 CONSTELLATIONS 480, 486–87
(2001) (arguing that the analytical utility of an analogy between the modern “global
business civilization” and the medieval law merchant system is limited because of the lack
of regulation of international commerce in medieval societies).
46
Macaulay, supra note 26, at 449–54.
47
Id. at 454–67.
48
Id. at 470–85.
49
Id. at 485–502.
50
Id.
51
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and locality, transparency of decision making, and the ensuing relative
inflexibility. Legally the state combines advantages—its rules are generally
hierarchically superior to privately made rules like contracts, and the state
maintains the monopoly of violence to enforce its laws—and disadvantages; it is
bound to a Constitution, unlike private actors. Effective governance aims at
combining the advantages of the state with the advantages of the respective private
groups and institutions. Private actors find it attractive to invoke the state for
enforcement because of its monopoly of power. The state, by contrast, sometimes
finds it attractive to outsource certain state functions to escape scrutiny. The fact
that private groups rely on the state for the enforcement of private rights is a wellknown argument against the idea of an autonomous private sphere.53 By contrast,
the outsourcing of state functions like military functions suggests that privatization
is not just the release of power from the state to the private realm; it is at least as
much a strategic move by the state and thus an explicit state government policy,
the privatization of the state by the state.54
Often then, questions as to non-state governance are really questions about a
particular form of state governance, namely that of deference.55 For example, when
we ask whether it is appropriate to limit freedoms, such as speech, religion and
association, if members of non-state communities are at risk, we ask not about
these groups’ autonomous governance but about the state’s role in it, because it is
the state that would limit these freedoms, and it is usually the state that we ask to
prevent such limitations. The question whether the state should interfere in the
self-governance of a religious group engaged in discrimination against its female
members is not a question about state governance versus non-state governance; it
is a question as to one kind of state governance (enforce the woman’s claim to
non-discrimination) versus another (enforce the group’s right to selfdetermination).56 The problem in the debate is not whether “we” should assign a
greater role to non-state institutions; the problem is that the “we” almost invariably
refers to the state and its policies.
This suggests that it is not enough to replace the state/non-state dichotomy
with an unspecified hybridity. To say that all governance is somehow
public/private is trivial. To dig deeper, we would have to analyze the specifics and
modalities of this hybridity—the modes, processes, and institutions that enable a
53
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fruitful cooperation between state and non-state groups. In what specific way is
governance shared among institutions, some belonging to the state and some not?
What are the exact hierarchies between these institutions? Are they in conflict or in
consensus? Etc.
IV. LEGITIMACY
Such closer analyses are not merely analytical and empirical, they also have a
normative dimension. If the debate on non-state governance were confined to
Taliban and Mafia, we would probably not hesitate to condemn it. Instead,
however, non-state governance is praised as superior to state government in a
variety of areas. Religious groups should be left alone from state intervention;
markets can best regulate themselves; codes of conduct developed by corporate
actors are more fine-tuned and more appropriate than state regulation; indigenous
populations should be allowed to devise their own norms instead of having to
adopt official state norms, etc. This raises a normative question. Regardless of
conceptual and empirical problems, would non-state governance actually be
desirable, and under what conditions? Is state governance desirable? Or what
public-private combination would be legitimate?
Such questions have become popular, but they are far too general and broad to
yield any meaningful answers—the non-category of the non-state does not allow
for any but the most general assessments. The question whether non-state
governance is legitimate or not cannot be answered in the abstract, just as the
question what kinds of governance actions are legitimate cannot be answered in the
abstract. More important, even whether such governance is instituted or
administered by the state or by other groups is a criterion of very limited relevance
for questions of legitimacy. Of course, there are some specific legitimacy criteria
for state action, and there are other legitimacy criteria for non-state action. For
example, state action must comply with certain constitutional requirements from
which private action is free, while private action must comply with state law while
the state can change sub-constitutional law. But these legal standards of legitimacy
are extremely contingent. They were created at a particular point in time for a
particular constellation of state and society, and as this constellation changes, such
legitimacy standards may change as well. The more deterritorialized the economy
becomes, the more willing we are to consider extraterritorial regulation by the state
justified.57 The less able the state becomes to provide proper frameworks for
corporate governance, the more legitimate private concepts become. In the United
States, private enforcement of product standards (through tort actions) may be
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more justified than in Europe simply because state institutions other than courts are
less successful at regulating such standards in the United States.58
Nonetheless, what we can see in the debate is how the state and our
experience with it permeate much of the debate.59 Thus, on the one hand, we see
attempts to replicate the legitimacy strategies within the state, to ask how non-state
governance can be similar to the state, for example how to constitutionalize the
private sphere. However, given that state constitutionalization took place in a very
specific constellation—that of the state—it is neither clear that it can be achieved
in the private sphere, nor certain that, if it can be achieved, it confers the same
legitimacy to the non-state group as does the constitution to the state. More
promising are attempts to show how non-state mechanisms are superior to the state
insofar as they avoid its shortcomings.60 However, not infrequently these
mechanisms cannot fulfill these functions, while at the same time they weaken the
state.61
The methodological problem is the same here as elsewhere: the state is used
as a benchmark. In one, it provides the criteria of legitimacy; in the other, it
provides what we want to get away from. Yet it is not clear why criteria of
legitimacy developed within one particular global constellation—that of the nation
state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—should be applicable to a twentyfirst-century world. There is no doubt that our criteria of legitimacy must be
informed by our experience with and in the state. But it also cannot be doubtful
that these criteria must be dislodged from the nation state. In the public sphere, we
see this in debates on the legitimacy of the European Union, which, because it is
not a state, is now increasingly (and rightly) being judged with criteria other than
those against which nation states are held.62
V. BEYOND THE NON-STATE
Many disciplines—political science, sociology, international relations, law—
have too long been focused exclusively on the state. The attention currently given
in these disciplines to different emanations of non-state governance is a welcome
development insofar as it broadens our field of study by requiring us to develop
more general theories of governance. These theories, however, will not make
significant progress unless they help us leave our focus on the state behind. To
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focus on the non-state as a category will not help us in this endeavor. What needs
to be done is to put the state in perspective in order to overcome it.
A first step is to deny the state its point at the top of the hierarchy. I pointed
out earlier the parallel hierarchies between French government studies and
Pufendorf’s natural law system, both of which move from the individual upward to
the state.63 Yet, the parallel is not complete. The state is the peak of the hierarchy
only for the authors that Foucault discusses—and, ultimately, also for Foucault
himself, who does not address the supranational and international realms.64 For
Pufendorf, by contrast, the state is merely one level in the hierarchy below the
higher level of international law.65 His system of law was not particularly focused
on the state; the state had only one of several functions to play in it.66 Granted, the
state later achieved a more central position, as Foucault shows, that justified, for
the time being, a focus on the “governmentalization” of the state. As such, it was
long central also for an “internationalized world.”67 But this may be changing.
A more important step concerns the very hierarchy of levels. If it is correct
that we are observing a move in the world from a political segmentary
differentiation along state borders toward a functional differentiation along
different societal groups, then this suggests that the methodologically central
position of the state is wavering, too.68 Note that in a world that shifts from
territoriality to functionality, the territorial state does not automatically lose its
role, but it must now justify that role on functional grounds.
A trajectory of theoretical accounts of governance should enable us to
overcome this focus on the state. We have already left behind a first stage of this
trajectory, namely the exclusive focus on the state, something that is sometimes
called methodological nationalism.69 The idea of non-state governance suggests a
second stage, that of a dichotomy of state and non-state, including the possibility
of hybridity. However, as I have argued, this is not a very fruitful stage, so a third
stage will be a more specific analysis of the particular modes and structures of that
hybridity, or of the particular mix of public and private governance. This makes it
63
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possible, at last, to deny the state its central position in the analysis and to develop,
on a fourth level, a governance theory beyond the state. On that level, the state’s
institutions exist on an equal level, analytically, with non-state institutions.
Postulating non-state governance challenges the state’s monopoly on the
creation and adjudication of law, but it does not challenge the framework in which
we think of governance, or government, as related and linked to the state. Nonstate governance is merely the flipside of a state government. Ironically, such a
conception does not weaken the importance of the state for governance, but
perpetuates it. It changes the state from a tacit background assumption to the prime
criterion with which we differentiate between kinds of governance. This limits in
crucial ways our ability to think creatively about governance. When we talk of
non-state governance, we imagine governance that either reproduces the way in
which we know law from the state, or provides its counterpart. A governance
concept that transcends the distinction between state and non-state laws, by
contrast, should enable us truly to imagine governance not only outside the state,
but outside even the dichotomy of state/non-state, outside the state framework
altogether. Non-state governance may once have been a necessary concept to
overcome the idea that all law is state law. However, as the mere negation of that
idea, it lacks constructive potential; its implications collapse into either the
negation or the replication of law within the state. We should leave this behind and
devote our attention to a governance concept that transcends these boundaries and
presents a more credible candidate for globalization and a functionally
differentiated global system: governance beyond the state.

